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Does Resemblance Really Matter?
A Commentary on Gerard O’Brien
Anne-Kathrin Koch
In this commentary on Gerard O’Brien’s “How does mind matter?—Solving the
content causation problem”, I will investigate the notion of representational con-
tent presented in the latter. With this notion, O’Brien aims at giving an explana-
tion of how mind matters in physicalist terms. His argumentation is motivated by,
and supposedly directed towards, a problem he calls the content causation prob-
lem.  Regarding  this,  I  am  most  interested  in  reconstructing  how his  account
relates to the presuppositions that make this problem so pressing in philosophical
enquiry. O’Brien provides a very interesting answer to the question of “why men-
tal content matters”, as motivated by the content causation problem. In particular,
I will try to show that by making use of the notion of dispositions, it provides an
interesting way of avoiding the presupposition that understanding content causa-
tion always requires the reduction of individual relational properties to individual
intrinsic properties—probably because it is presupposed that such a reduction is
impossible. 
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1 Introduction
Gerard O’Brien’s paper “How does mind mat-
ter?—Solving  the  content  causation  problem”
(this collection)  is  situated  at  the  border  of
philosophy and  cognitive  science.  The  subject
matter, as announced by the title, is the causal
efficacy of mental content, especially of repres-
entational content. O’Brien approaches this sub-
ject in three argumentative steps: first he intro-
duces us to a problem called the content causa-
tion problem, then he proposes a conception of
representation that he calls the  triadic concep-
tion of  representation,  and,  third,  he enriches
this concept by proposing a second-order simil-
arity theory of content determination.
In  this  commentary  I  will  try  to  recon-
struct  how  these  three  points  relate  to  each
other, focusing in particular on the role that the
content  causation  problem plays  in  the  other
two  argumentative  steps.  O’Brien’s  theory  of
representational content and its causal efficacy
is doubtlessly interesting even when considered
in isolation, as I will briefly outline in section 2.
In section 3, I will try to show that the content
causation problem demands us to be more spe-
cific than when just investigating the question
of how mind matters. In section 4, I will try to
show how O’Brien’s  account  of  the  relational
character of mental content, which is at the core
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of his argumentation, gains its philosophical rel-
evance from implicit assumptions that form the
conceptual foundations of the content causation
problem as here formulated. In an attempt to
assess whether his  account must really be re-
garded as  solving the content causation prob-
lem, I will highlight in section 5 how important
it is to be specific about what we really mean if
we suppose that representation is somehow  re-
lational in character. 
2 How mind might matter
In his paper in  this collection,  Gerard O’Brien
confronts  the  task  of  “explaining  how  mind
matters”  (p.  12).  He  does  so,  because  he—
rightly, I believe—identifies the fact “that our
minds matter—that our beliefs and desires, and
our perceptions and thoughts ultimately have a
causal impact on our behaviour” as a ubiquit-
ous  and  well-accepted,  but  unexplained  phe-
nomenon (p. 1). 
O’Brien’s  investigation  is  motivated  by
the following question: “[h]ow can mental phe-
nomena be causally efficacious of behaviour in
virtue  of  their  representational  contents  if
those contents are not determined by intrinsic
properties of the brain?” (O’Brien this collec-
tion, p. 2) He calls this question the “content
causation problem” (ibid., p. 2). This specific
way of approaching the matter of mental caus-
ation is set in the context of “three widely ac-
cepted  theses  about  mental  phenomena  and
their physical realization in the brain” (ibid.,
p. 2): (i) the supposed causal efficacy of men-
tal phenomena is grounded in their represent-
ational  contents,  which,  (ii)  are  taken to  be
relational properties  of  those  phenomena
(ibid., p. 2–3); and (iii) the results of neuros-
cience, which already provide us with an ex-
planation  of  how  behaviour  is  caused,  only
make use of the brain and its intrinsic proper-
ties in their explanation (ibid., p. 2). Hence,
there  is  a  need  for  an  explanation  of  beha-
viour  being  caused by mental  phenomena in
virtue of their  relational properties,  and this
explanation cannot easily make use of the ex-
planation of  the causation of  behaviour that
has  already  been  provided  by  contemporary
neuroscience. At first, it looks as if this short-
fall is exactly what O’Brien is addressing.
Philosophical mainstream accounts of rep-
resentation, O’Brien reminds us, are built on an
understanding of representation as a two-place
relation.  Representational  content  is  thus  de-
scribed in terms of  aboutness and/or reference.
O’Brien,  however,  advises  us  to  abandon  the
traditional understanding of the notion of rep-
resentation, i.e., the idea that representation is
a two-place relation and adequately phrased in
terms of one thing being about another (O’Brien
this collection, p. 3–4). Instead, he proposes a
triadic  conception  of  representation,  making
representation a three-place relation between a
represented object,  a representing vehicle,  and
an interpretation (ibid., p. 5). 
In the triadic picture, interpretation is “a
cognitive effect [of the object] in the subject”,
thereby establishing a relationship between this
subject and the represented object (O’Brien this
collection., p. 5). The ingenious move here, of
course,  is  that  interpretation  is  explained  in
causal vocabulary. We should think of interpret-
ation  as  “presumably  implicating  the  produc-
tion of mental representing vehicles” possessing
new properties, which should in turn be thought
of as “bring[ing] the subject into some appropri-
ate relationship to the original vehicle’s repres-
ented object” (ibid., p. 5), i.e., “modifying [the
subject’s] behavioural dispositions” (ibid., p. 6).
At first, when O’Brien further describes those
vehicles  as  “hav[ing]  […]  cognitive  and  ulti-
mately behavioural effects” (ibid., p. 6), it isn’t
clear  exactly  which  category  we  are  dealing
with. I take the relata of the causation relation
to be events, but understand talk of vehicles to
be talk about objects.1 I suggest that we under-
stand the vehicles as modifying the system’s be-
havioural dispositions insofar as, once produced,
they have  certain  properties  that  are  directly
and specifically relevant for a causal process to
take place (given that some sort of stimulus ini-
tiates the causal process). If we adopted a view
of dispositions as second-order  properties,  i.e.,
the property of having certain properties that
1 If we want to avoid reification of the “vehicles”, we might look at it
them as time-slices in a complex, internal chain of events, i.e., of dy-
namic inner processes modifying a subject’s global dispositions. 
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can be causally relevant (cf. Choi & Fara 2014),
this would allow us to think of the vehicles as
modifying global dispositions of a system as a
whole, in the sense of providing new ones—that
is,  by  themselves  having  novel  dispositional
properties. This way, we can analyze the obtain-
ing of the representation relation as a specific
causal process having taken place: the first step
of that process is the triggering of the cognitive
effect  by  the  representandum  (the  first  re-
latum); the second relatum is the event of inter-
pretation  itself;  and  the  third  relatum is  the
new vehicle produced during the event of inter-
pretation that provides the subject with a new
behavioural  disposition  towards  the  represent-
andum. The representational character of men-
tal content, in this picture, just rests on what
we call “content” resulting from the multi-layer
causal process described above.2
O’Brien’s triadic account of representation
describes the obtaining of the representation re-
lation not in terms of our everyday intuitions
about representation, but in terms of the job it
is  supposedly  doing  for  us:  bridging  the  gap
between whatever is going on in the sphere of
“the mental” and the external world by alluding
to the causal chain that unites the two. It  is
thus understandable why the dyadic conception
might be accused of  hiding behind terms like
“aboutness”  or  “reference”:  saying  that  some-
thing mental is about something external is just
saying that there is a gap being bridged. Saying
that something external sets a three-step causal
chain in motion with the result that a subject
has undergone a specific change in her behavi-
oural dispositions seems much closer to saying
what the bridge is made of. 
Yet  we should still  dispose of  the vague
language of “specific change in her behavioural
2 It might be said that this understanding of representation is plaus-
ible for paradigmatic cases of representation, like the representation
of material objects, but that it is less clear whether it is also fit to
capture cases that differ strongly from those paradigms, like the rep-
resentation of abstract “objects”. 
A similar worry, which has been pointed out to me by an anonymous
reviewer,  concerns  cases  of  fictional  representations,  e.g.,  future
events. For this specific example, she/he suggests that we allow for
the causal chain to be reversed. This would make the representan-
dum part of the final event. However, this solution applies only to
those  cases  of  fictional  representation  where  the  representandum
does not yet exist, but leaves the majority of cases of fictional repres-
entation inexplicable.
dispositions”. What exactly makes this change
specific? It was called “specific” because it se-
lectively relates back to the object that set the
causal  chain in  motion in  the first  place and
which we would like to keep calling “the repres-
ented  object.”3 But  how can the  change  in  a
subject’s  behavioural  dispositions  make  them
pick out the exact same object from which this
change originates?4 The answer to this lies in
the theory of content determination. 
When  holding  that  the  representing
vehicle brings about a change in the subject’s
behavioural dispositions, causal theories of con-
tent determination are supposedly to be aban-
doned because of a “disconnect between world–
mind  causal  relations  and  a  system’s  behavi-
oural  dispositions”  (O’Brien this collection,  p.
12). An appropriate theory of content determin-
ation—so says a desideratum that we gain from
the results of the triadic analysis of representa-
tion—must “explain how [inner vehicles] endow
systems with the capacity to respond in a dis-
criminating  fashion  towards  [external  condi-
tions]” (ibid., p. 12). For fulfillment of this cri-
terion, O’Brien turns to resemblance theories of
content determination, which “hold that repres-
enting vehicles are contentful in virtue of resem-
bling their represented objects” (this collection,
p. 9).
Within the triadic conception of represent-
ation, O’Brien identifies  two hurdles for a re-
semblance theory that still need to be overcome:
it must be shown how the theory can be com-
patible with physicalism, and it must be secured
that  the  theory  does  not  leave  content  inde-
terminate (ibid., pp. 9–11).
In order to secure the compatibility of a
resemblance  theory  of  content  determination
with physicalism, O’Brien turns away from the
notion  of  first-order  resemblance  and  instead
makes use of structural or second-order resemb-
lance  (ibid.,  pp.  10–11).  He  thus  avoids  the
seemingly  naive  and  implausible  thesis  that
3 I will, inspired by O’Brien’s terminology, keep refering to the rep-
resentandum  as  the  represented  object.  The  term  “object”  is
thereby used in a very wide sense and not intended to be restric -
ted to single material objects. What exactly can take the place of
an object in  O’Brien’s  story  of  representation is  yet  to be  de-
termined.
4 This question presupposes that the established representation is ac-
tually correct and not a case of misrepresentation. 
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mental  representations  must  actually  share
properties  with what they represent  (ibid.,  p.
10).  Resemblance is  taken to a more abstract
level where, for example, something red can be
mentally represented with the representation re-
sembling the representandum, but without them
both sharing the property of being red (ibid.,
pp. 10–11). 
The second hurdle might seem redundant
at  first  glance.  Explaining how content  is  de-
termined is  basically  the  job  description  of  a
theory of content determination. It is still worth
mentioning  this  as  an  obstacle,  however,  be-
cause the reliance on second-order resemblance
makes  this  job  look  particularly  difficult:
second-order  resemblance  is  too  easily  estab-
lished. If a set of mental representations second-
order resembles a pattern of colour shades,  it
might in virtue of the same relational organiza-
tion also second-order resemble a pattern of loc-
ations in a two-dimensional space. Nevertheless,
O’Brien trusts that within the triadic concep-
tion of representation, second-order resemblance
will do the job. The idea is that some of the
possibilities for the content of a vehicle that are
left open by second-order resemblance are ruled
out in the process of interpretation—interpreta-
tion  is  “content-limiting”  by  “anchoring
vehicles” in “domains” (O’Brien this collection,
p. 11). The preexisting behavioural dispositions
influence  the  newly  developing  ones,  so  that
they are not directed towards all domains with
a specific relational organisation, but towards a
selection of these. 
So far, O’Brien has provided us with an
interesting  account of  how mental  phenomena
are causally efficacious in virtue of their repres-
entational contents: the property 
x has representational content
is analyzed as the property 
x results from a causal process that brings
about behavioural dispositions towards the
object that triggered the causal process.
These behavioural dispositions,  given their re-
spective stimuli, can now yield causal effects.
But if we took this as O’Brien’s only ac-
complishment, we would miss the most interest-
ing  part  of  his  argument.  Furthermore,  we
would take the second step before the first. 
3 Content and causation: from a question
to a problem
So far, I have interpreted O’Brien’s formulation
of  the  content  causation  problem  (“How  can
mental phenomena be causally efficacious of be-
haviour in virtue of their representational con-
tents if these contents are not determined by in-
trinsic  properties  of  the  brain?”  O’Brien this
collection, p. 2) as something along the lines of
“How does mental causation in virtue of repres-
entational content work, if  not in the way we
already know it sometimes works?” In so doing,
one already engages in an interesting discussion
about  content  causation.  But  closer  examina-
tion reveals that this understanding of the prob-
lem is an oversimplification. The content causa-
tion  problem  is  supposed  to  be  much  more
severe. It is not a problem about finding altern-
ative explanations to the ones we already have,
but  about the  consistency  of  all  available  ex-
planations. A better understanding of the prob-
lem will help us to evaluate whether O’Brien’s
suggestions,  which  are  doubtlessly  interesting,
are really motivated by the problem at hand.
The three theses, that (i) the causal effic-
acy of mental phenomena is grounded in their
representational  contents,  that  (ii)  these  “are
not determined by the intrinsic properties of the
brain” (O’Brien this collection, p. 2), and that
(iii) the brain’s causal efficacy for behaviour is
grounded only in its  intrinsic properties,  sup-
posedly “form an inconsistent triad” (ibid., p.
2). Yet, strictly speaking, they are not inconsist-
ent: why not say that what we do in theses (i)
to (iii) is gathering information about (human)
behaviour—our object of enquiry—but on two
levels  of  description?  On  both  levels,  we  at-
tempt, metaphorically speaking, to travel back
along  the  causal  chain  that  brings  behaviour
about. On the one level, we then discover that
intrinsic properties of the brain are responsible
for it to cause behaviour (ibid., p. 2, thesis 3).
On another level,  we trace behaviour back to
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mental phenomena, which owe their capacity to
cause it to their representational contents (ibid.,
p. 2, thesis 1). Why not assume that these two
levels both provide us with (true) formulations
of what is happening, but which—since they de-
pend  on  two  conceptual  frameworks  that  are
not  intertranslatable—must  be  regarded  as
nomologically  incommensurable?  If  so,  they
could never both be part of a unified causal the-
ory  (see  Davidson 1970).  This  picture  seems
perfectly intelligible at first. But on both levels,
we talk about causes of (presumably the same)
behaviour. 
Within  a  physicalist  framework,  we take
behaviour to fall, in the end, under the descrip-
tion of a physical event. As such, it is subject to
the principle of causal closure: if it is caused, it
has  a  sufficient  physical  cause  (Kim 1989,  p.
43). Hence, we should pay close attention to the
fact that “our best neuroscience informs us that
the changes to musculature that constitute our
behavioural responses are wholly determined by
the  intrinsic  properties  of  the brain  to  which
they are causally connected” (O’Brien this col-
lection, p. 2). Thus it is not only assumed that
the  brain  can be  causally  efficacious  of  beha-
viour  in  virtue  of  its  intrinsic  properties,  but
also that whenever behaviour is caused, it is al-
ways caused in the brain and in virtue of the
brain’s intrinsic properties. Yet mental phenom-
ena, which are of a non-physical kind, are also
mentioned in (i) as a cause of behaviour. But
with brain states already providing a sufficient
cause for behaviour, what role in causation can
they possibly play (Kim 1989, pp. 43–44)? As
long  as  we  cannot  answer  question,  we  are
forced to reject the possibility that behaviour is
over-determined,  or,  in  other  words,  we  are
forced to accept  both mental  phenomena and
brain states as two separate causes of behaviour.
So  causally  efficacious  mental  phenomena
should  be  reducible  to  the  physical  cause
already provided by the states of the brain, or
we must conclude that they are not a cause at
all. In the latter case, this would mean that we
would have to deny “that our beliefs and de-
sires,  and  our  perceptions  and  thoughts  ulti-
mately have a causal impact on our behaviour”
(O’Brien this collection,  p.  1)  and  we  would
have to  accuse  every  discipline  accepting  this
tenet—O’Brien names folk psychology and the
computational theory of mind (ibid., p. 2)—of
operating with a faulty ontology, pointing out
causes that do not really exist.5 
Now we have made explicit a metaphysical
constraint that was left implicit in the formula-
tion of the content causation problem: mental
properties and all their capacities, e.g., their ca-
pacity to cause behaviour, must be reducible to
properties of the physical brain. Knowing this,
we see where the supposed inconsistency comes
from: we traditionally think of representational
content  not  as  determined  by  the  brain’s  in-
trinsic properties, but rather as determined by
what it is about (O’Brien this collection, p. 2–
3). But if the content causation problem dares
us to integrate these two things, namely the de-
scription of mental phenomena as causing beha-
viour in virtue of their representational contents
and  our  theory  of  the  same  behaviour  being
caused by processes in the brain in virtue of the
brain’s intrinsic properties, then we might con-
clude with O’Brien:
A solution to the content causation prob-
lem requires  something  that  prima  facie
appears impossible: an explanation of the
relational character of mental content that
invokes only the intrinsic properties of the
brain. (this collection, p. 3)
This is what turns the content causation prob-
lem as formulated by O’Brien from an interest-
ing question into an urgent philosophical prob-
lem. The apparent impossibility of a solution re-
lies on the idea of a sharp distinction between
relational  and intrinsic  properties.  If  our best
shot at understanding whatever we describe as
the  “relational  character”  of  representational
content is to understand it as a relational prop-
erty,6 then its irreducibility to intrinsic proper-
ties of the brain is built into it—and so is the
insolvability of the content causation problem,
given  the  metaphysical  constraint  just  men-
5 The threat lurking in the background is, of course, eliminative ma-
terialism (cf. Churchland 1981).
6 Remember that this kind of property is even referred to as “not de-
termined by the intrinsic properties of the brain” (O’Brien this col-
lection, p. 2).
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tioned. Nevertheless, O’Brien aims to provide a
solution. 
4 The relational character of 
representational content
We see now that an attempt to solve the content
causation problem must address the question of
how the specific character of representational con-
tent can be analyzed in a way that invokes only
the intrinsic properties of the brain (instead of
being understood as “being a relational property
and not an intrinsic property of the brain”). How-
ever, O’Brien advertises a theory of content de-
termination that draws on second-order similarity
between mental vehicles and the outside world as
necessary for a solution to the content causation
problem. In fact, he admits that “all theories of
mental representation, in their efforts to explain
the  relational  character  of  mental  content,  are
forced  to  invoke  world-mind  relations  of  some
kind”, where the latter term seemingly refers back
to “relations that incorporate factors beyond the
brain” (O’Brien this collection, p. 12). But how
does this relate to the explicit goal of providing
“an  explanation  of  the  relational character  of
mental  content  that  invokes  only  the  intrinsic
properties of the brain”, which would only “prima
facie  [appear]”  to be,  but not—as the content
causation problem is supposed to have a solution
—actually  be “impossible” (O’Brien this collec-
tion, p. 3)? 
The  answer  to  this  might  lie  in  a  view
which can be found in O’Brien & Opie:
Von Eckardt observes that the triadicity of
representation in general, and mental rep-
resentation in particular, can be analysed
into two dyadic component relations: one
between representing vehicle and represen-
ted  object  (which  she  calls  the  content
grounding  relation);  the  other  between
vehicle  and  interpretation  […]  This  sug-
gests that any theory of mental represent-
ation must be made up of (at least) two
parts7: one that explains how the content
7 A third relation that one might want to look at when “taking apart”
the triadic relation of representation is the relation between inter-
pretation and represented object. 
of  mental  vehicles  is  grounded,  and  a
second that explains how they are inter-
preted. (2004, p. 5)
When O’Brien writes that every theory of repres-
entational content, including his own, must make
use of factors extrinsic to the brain, he most likely
refers to the content grounding relation—in his
case,  second-order  resemblance.  Yet  when  he
promises  us  “an  explanation  of  the  relational
character of mental content that invokes only the
intrinsic  properties  of  the  brain”  (O’Brien this
collection, p. 3), the scientific explanation men-
tioned most likely refers to the other part of the
theory  of  mental  representation:  the  internalist
theory of interpretation. If O’Brien takes it that
only this theory, which provides us with a recon-
struction of the causal processes involved in men-
tal representation, needs to be presented in terms
of  intrinsic  properties  of  the  brain,  then  he
provides an account within the “narrow content
program” (ibid, p. 3): this research program ac-
cepts the thesis that “[t]he representational con-
tents of mental phenomena are not determined by
the intrinsic properties of the brain” (ibid., p. 2)
but— quite plausibly, I think—relaxes the meta-
physical constraint made explicit in section 3 in-
sofar as it only demands “an account of mental
phenomena according to which (at least the caus-
ally relevant component of) their representational
properties  are determined by intrinsic properties
of the brain” (ibid., p. 3, my emphasis).
If  this  is  a  correct  reconstruction  of
O’Brien’s steps towards a solution to the con-
tent causation problem, then he has reached his
goal if he: 
a) has provided an account of the causally-relev-
ant components of representation that makes
use  of  only  the  intrinsic  properties  of  the
brain, and
b) can make sure that this account still deserves
to be called an account of representation, i.e.,
captures the specific characteristics of repres-
entational content that we have so far called
“relational”.
O’Brien claims that “[t]he insight offered by tri-
adicity is that the relational character of mental
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content is to be discharged ultimately in terms
of our behavioural dispositions towards features
of the world” (this collection, p. 12). While it
might  not  be  clear  at  first  sight  why  this
provides a solution to the problem at hand, I
am  convinced  that  a  view  of  dispositions  as
second-order  properties—such  as  the  property
of having a property that becomes relevant for
the causing of  a  certain manifestation  once  a
certain  stimulus  is  provided—helps  us  to  see
how  O’Brien’s  account  provides  a  solution.  I
hope to have shown in section 2 how the adop-
tion of the view that dispositions are second-or-
der properties fits into his picture of representa-
tion. Thus I believe that it allows us to regard
the  first  of  the  two  requirements  mentioned
above as fulfilled: I see no reason why such a
second-order property should not be understood
as an intrinsic property of the brain. Further-
more, I hold that this view allows us to regard
the second requirement as fulfilled, too: the dis-
positions in question seem to deserve the label
“relational” insofar as, when combined with a
certain stimulus, they are manifested in terms
of overt, observable behaviour of a biological or-
ganism.  When  so  manifested,  they  turn  into
concrete chains of events linked by causal  rela-
tions. One can now argue that these potential
relations are what let us intuitively characterize
representation  as  relational.  So  understood,
O’Brien’s explanation does justice to the project
of providing an account that captures the spe-
cific character that makes representational con-
tent  deserve  the  label  “representational”,  but
without  characterizing  its  causally  efficacious
components as being relational properties. 
5 The content causation problem and 
second-order resemblance relations
If this is to be seen as a successful analysis of
representational  content  in  terms of  intrinsic
properties of the brain, we can conclude that
the triadic picture alone—with its analysis of
the  relational  character  of  representational
content  in  terms  of  dispositions—already
solves the content causation problem. Hence,
this  problem,  by  itself,  offers  criteria  that
could  be  turned  into  an  argument  for  or
against any specific theory of content determ-
ination. 
Such a theory, as I understand it, serves
two  purposes:  it  explains  how  the  contentful
vehicles  of  which  the  theory  of  interpretation
makes  use  are  individuated,  and  it  explains
“how  relations  between  mental  vehicles  and
their  represented  objects  can  endow  subjects
with the capacity to respond selectively to those
very features of the world” (O’Brien this collec-
tion, p. 6). It thus provides the background in-
formation necessary for understanding why the
theory of interpretation is able to do what is re-
quired  of  it.  The  second  desideratum is  only
made  clear  if  the  triadic  account  of  content
causation is adopted. According to O’Brien, it
can only be fulfilled if we adopt the resemblance
theory of content determination, because “[t]he
obtaining of  causal  relations  between external
conditions  and  inner  vehicles  cannot  explain
how the latter endow systems with the capacity
to respond in a discriminating fashion towards
the former” (ibid., p. 12), whereas “resemblance
does offer  some prospect  of  a  solution to the
content causation problem. The key here is that
the mere obtaining of the resemblance ensures
that the former have properties that can be ex-
ploited to shape the behavioural dispositions of
cognitive systems towards the latter” (ibid., p.
12).
Let us recapitulate the steps that took us
from  the  content  causation  problem  to  the
second-order resemblance theory of content de-
termination.  The  content  causation  problem
motivates the triadic account of representation
if we assume that it is a problem about reduc-
tion and if we assume that there is a sharp dis-
tinction between relational and intrinsic proper-
ties  that  forbids  an analysis  of  the former  in
terms of the latter, thus preventing the reduc-
tion of a theory of causally efficacious mental
phenomena to a theory of brain-based causation
of behaviour. The triadic account of representa-
tion solves this problem by showing us that we
need not assume that representational content
owes its specific character to relational proper-
ties. Dispositions, understood as non-relational
second-order  properties,  do  justice  to  our
concept of “relational character”. The triadic ac-
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count then needs to be enriched by a theory of
content  determination,  and  its  use  of  the
concept of  a  “disposition” leads to a new re-
quirement: to explain how inner vehicles can en-
able a subject to respond selectively towards ex-
ternal objects. Supposedly, only second-order re-
semblance can fulfill this requirement. Thus un-
derstood, a second-order resemblance theory of
content-determination is only indirectly relevant
to a solution of the content causation problem. 
Yet  I  would like to point  out  a way in
which the second-order resemblance theory it-
self  relates to the content causation problem.
Second-order resemblance between vehicles and
objects tells us that there is a mapping from
objects  to  vehicles  that  is  pattern-preserving
or,  in  other  words,  some  objects  and  some
vehicles  are  alike  in  some  of  their  relational
properties. Nevertheless, the kind of pattern in-
volved is to be “sustained by constraints inher-
ent in the vehicles, rather than being imposed
extrinsically”  (O’Brien this collection,  p.  11,
footnote  11).  The  relations  constituting  a
structure or pattern collectively supervene on
the  distribution  of  intrinsic  properties  of  ob-
jects and vehicles, although individual extrinsic
(and  specifically  relational)  properties  of  ob-
jects and vehicles do not. This strategy of ex-
planation is in principle also available to our
understanding of content: contents, fixed by a
structural  organisation  of  vehicles,  are  rela-
tional  in  the  same,  completely  unproblematic
sense. Representational contents may not indi-
vidually be determined by intrinsic properties
of the brain, but there is a sense in which they
are  so  collectively.  But  this  might  count  as
evidence against the second thesis of the con-
tent causation problem: that “[t]he representa-
tional contents  of  mental  phenomena are not
determined by the  intrinsic  properties  of  the
brain” (ibid., p. 2). One might then even say
that content is  not relational at all, and that
the puzzle that actually troubles us is the ques-
tion of how representations can have something
to which they are applied,  namely a “target”
(Cummins 1996, p. 8).8 This could still be ac-
counted for by the triadic picture of represent-
8 I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.
ation, but it would then not amount to solving
the content causation problem, but to rejecting
it. 
6 Conclusion 
In his target article,  Gerard O’Brien addresses
the question of “how the specifically representa-
tional properties of mental phenomena can be
causally efficacious of behavior” (this collection,
p. 12). When he does so, there are two parts of
the problem to be considered:  the first  is  ex-
plaining how mind matters, and the second is
showing how an answer can prevail in the light
of  the content causation problem. Considering
the first part in isolation, O’Brien provides an
interesting  answer.  He  translates  our  talk  of
representation  into  causal  vocabulary,  thereby
making it possible to reach a concept of caus-
ally efficacious representational content. In or-
der to understand how O’Brien’s account needs
to be assessed with regard to the second part,
one first needs to reconstruct which background
assumptions make the content causation prob-
lem so pressing. 
I  am convinced that the issues of  reduc-
tion and  the  relational/intrinsic  property  dis-
tinction need to be addressed in order to under-
stand whether and how the content causation
problem can motivate an account like O’Brien’s.
His account takes as a starting point that rep-
resentational content has a relational character,
but should not be understood in terms of rela-
tional  properties.  Rather,  as  we have  seen,  it
should be understood in terms of dispositions—
which can, if manifested, establish causal rela-
tions,  but  are  not  relational  by themselves.  I
hope to have provided a reconstruction of how
this starting point is used to reach the conclu-
sion  that,  as  O’Brien formulates  it,  “resemb-
lance  theories  appear  obligatory,  since  they
alone  offer  some  prospect  for  explaining  how
mind matters” (this collection, p. 12). 
If this is correct, there remains one ques-
tion: whether resemblance theories of the pro-
posed kind might themselves indicate that the
content causation problem rests on a mistake.
The  problem  presupposes  further  problems
about the role of relational and intrinsic proper-
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ties that need not be addressed in order to ac-
count for the causal efficacy of representational
content.  The  content  causation  problem’s  not
arising in the first place would, of course, not
undermine O’Brien’s highly interesting account.
It is only that this problem could no longer be
used  to  motivate  the  argumentative  steps  he
takes. Still, his account is illuminating for many
other  reasons,  such  as  translating  mysterious
talk about “being about” into naturalistic ter-
minology. However, whether we can regard the
content causation problem as solved or rather as
successfully rejected is not clear; but instead of
worrying  about  this  problem,  we  might  now
turn towards the details  of O’Brien’s account.
An interesting starting point for such further in-
quiry might be to try to reach a better under-
standing of the role and the kind of dispositions
and  vehicles involved  in  causal  processes,  for
they form two of the key concepts in O’Brien’s
theory. 
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